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  But so many notes, my dear Mozart 
 None more than necessary, Your Majesty. 
    Mozart, to the king 
 
...like a world that suddenly sounds strange. 
   Helmut Lachenmann 
 
The Musical Death of God and its Discontents 
Max Weber has a thesis that, in its own way, sums up a certain still hegemonic way 
of understanding the emergence of musical autonomy. It insists that Western music 
has consolidated itself as autonomous from external ends by breaking its 
submission to ritual and theological functions. This process meant that both his 
audition and his composition were deprived of submission to what he calls "practical 
purposes": 
 
Sociologically primitive music appears to a considerable extent to have been 
removed at an early evolutionary stage from the sphere of pure aesthetic 
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enjoyment and subjected to practical requirements. It was addressed to 
magical ends, particularly apotropaic (cult) and exorcistic (medicinal) needs 
(...) Rationalization proper commences with the evolution of music into a 
professional art, be it of sacerdotal or aoidic nature: that is reaching beyond 
the limited use of tone formulae for practical purposes, thus awakening purely 
aesthetic needs1.  
 
There are two important statements in this passage. First, we find the 
sociological assertion of the non-existence of unsubordinated music at a certain 
supposedly “primitive” stage of musical experience. Weber believes that a non-
subordinate music has as a condition of existence the separation of the musical 
performance from other social functions. This separation supposedly occurred only 
in eighteenth-century Europe, mainly through the exhaustion of the Pythagorean 
perspective in music, with its holistic view of music as a phenomenon subordinated 
to the logic of celestial harmony2. Such separation also expresses itself through the 
release from a doctrine of affects and rhetoric, this in favor of the advent of an 
expression that will no longer be thought as mimesis, at least in the sense that this 
term was taken as “imitation”. Such processes produce a change in the social place 
of music, with the emergence of exclusive spaces for listening and contemplation, 
such as the concert halls which  appear simultaneously. 
But the proposition would only be sociologically interesting (although it should 
be anthropologically proven, which Weber does not do, as this would presuppose a 
knowledge of the historical development of the musical phenomenon outside of the 
West;  an obstacle for analysis of this magnitude served by his Eurocentrism) if it 
wasn’t follow by the affirmation of “purely aesthetic needs” initially resulting from the 
rationalization of the musical form and, consequently, from an immanent principle of 
development of its materials. This means that, free from submission to the unifying 
power of theological-political bounds, music would also be free from the external 
force that would cause stereotyping of intervals, structures and phrases. The 
disenchantment of its social function would, at the same time, release the plastic 
force of its materials. 
Such immanent liberation of the musical form would be based, as it could not 
be different in the case of Weber, on the generalization of determinations through 
calculation, measurement and quantification. In other words, those principles of 
instrumental reason that unite capitalist economic rationality and the breakdown of 
the qualitative world of Aristotelian physics would not be foreign to the consolidation 
of the purely aesthetic needs brought about by the musical form. There would be a 
force of abstraction operating in the musical form, a force normatively symmetrical to 
CONTINENTAL THOUGHT & THEORY: A JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM 
 Thinking Music: Praxis and Aesthetics 
 
 
109  http://dx.doi.org/10.26021/12229 
 
that operating in the fields of science and economics, which paradoxically ends up 
putting in check the Weberian narrative of the autonomous musical form, since it 
participates, in its own way, of the structural principles of hegemonic instrumental 
rationality in the capitalist order3.  
Note, however, that the association between music and mathematics is an 
inaugural musical phenomenon in the West, this due to the influence of the 
Pythagorean perspective. Let's remember how, even in the Middle Ages, music is 
part of a Cosmos, having no autonomous reality, which justifies its presence in the 
quadrivium alongside arithmetic, astronomy and geometry. For centuries, musical 
sound will be treated as a “sound number” and its logic will be subjected to the 
mimetically sustained harmony between the celestial orbits and the movements of 
the soul. Music thus appears as a subordinate expression, subject to arithmetic. 
From the hegemony of Christian thought, such foundations will bear the marks of the 
principles revealed by God, as Saint Thomas Aquinas will say. 
In a way, such subordination to arithmetic remains but on a now disenchanted 
horizon. As Hollander will say, the 18th century will experience a “untuning of the sky” 
resulting from a slow disenchantment of musical aesthetics4. This untuning is linked 
to the autonomization of the relationship between music and mathematics in the 
face of metaphysical principles of cosmological harmony. As we have seen on 
several occasions, the elements that define the axis of a structural transformation will 
almost all be present in the previous situation, but organized in a specific device that 
will collapse, freeing them to play new roles5. This is the phenomenon Max Weber 
has in mind. It is by means of mathematics that music was subordinated to 
cosmology. It is by means of mathematics that it will assert its autonomy. In a way, 
the early criticism of such a model of abstraction could be found in Hegel: 
 
Since the musical element of sound and the inner life, in which the content 
proceeds, is so abstract and formal we cannot go on to particularize without at 
once running into technical matters such as numerical relations between 
notes, differences between instruments, keys, concords, etc. But I am little 
versed in this sphere, and must therefore excuse myself in advance for 
restricting myself simply to the more general points and to single remarks6. 
 
No one should be fooled by this unexpected and unique confession of humility 
coming from the philosopher who never had any problem talking about everything. 
It's just a polite way of saying the irrelevance of music precisely due to its immanent 
process of rationalization. It is not surprising that the philosopher who has never 
stopped criticizing the abstraction of mathematical thought sees in music a sterile 
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path, with its relations of measure, proportion, its analysis of chords, etc. After all, as it 
was still said at the time: “Music is a science that must define rules: such rules must 
derive from an evident principle and such principle cannot be known by us without 
the help of mathematics”7. This rationalization would be, at least according to a 
certain tradition that encompasses Hegel, the ultimate figure of the sunset of art, of 
its incapacity to be the vehicle of social emancipation. The musical element of sound 
would be abstract and formal because it would simply indicate that the aesthetic 
experience delights in the contemplation of itself, it is lost in an autonomy that would 
be nothing more than the formalist cult of abstraction. 
In a way, the Hegelian aesthetic has, as one of its greatest characteristics, the 
refusal of any possible relationship between meaning and aesthetic autonomy. The 
famous phrase that works of art have lost the power to make us bend our knees, is 
Hegel's poetic way of asserting that there is no longer rooting of the aesthetic 
experience in the spiritualization of social life, which it finds itself in an impasse very 
well expressed by the primacy of music within German romanticism. The Hegelian 
aesthetic is anti-romantic par excellence. 
This impasse would combine extreme formalism and equally extreme 
subjectivism. Formalism would only be the instrument of a profound indeterminacy 
and formless interiority. For music would be: “of all the arts, the one that is most apt 
to free itself (...) from the expression of all determined content (Ausdruck ingerdeines 
bestimmten)”8. Unlike poetry, where the phonic signifier would continue to be the 
designation of a representation and would not aspire to meaning only by itself, music 
would allow the sound form to become an essential end in itself. But music loses the 
inner objectivity of the concepts and representations that poetic language would still 
be able to present to consciousness. Music would thus appear as a language of the 
subjective interiority of sensation: “Consciousness which is no longer confronted by 
an object and which in the loss of this freedom [of contemplation] is carried away 
itself by the ever-flowing stream of sounds“9. It is the empty abstraction that links 
formalism and subjectivism. 
However, it is necessary to insist on the non-hegemonic position of the 
Hegelian aesthetic. For posterity from Schopenhauer to Clement Greenberg, music 
would have allowed, on the contrary, the consolidation of devices that will serve as a 
model for the development of other arts. And, in this sense, the drastic change in the 
evaluation of musical language from Kant and Hegel to Schopenhauer and 
Nietzsche indicates the consolidation of music as the paradigmatic art as such. 
Such consolidation had been tested for over a century. Even in the 17th 
century, music appeared in a fundamental process for the constitution of a notion of 
modernity that was initially an aesthetic invention. It is for no other reason that 
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Charles Perrault, in his text The Century of Louis the Great, which will drive the 
Quarrel of the ancients and the moderns, regarding music, says: 
 
Greece, I grant, had unparalleled voices 
Whose extreme sweetness enchanted the ears 
Its spirited masters composed songs 
Like Lully's, natural and touching 
But they had no knowledge of the incredible sweetness 
The chords produce with its pleasant encounter 
Despite all the noise made by Greece 
In it such art was imperfect10. 
 
In other words, music is the art recognized by Perrault in which antiquity can appear 
in its greatest imperfection when compared to modernity. This isn’t the result of an 
idiosyncrasy. It is expressed as an objective condition of musical language in the 
mid-17th century. For music was about to express in the most explicit way the advent 
of a radical rupture in the ordering pattern, thanks to the emergence of the tonal 
system and its rules of harmony and progression. If the Greeks were unaware of the 
incredible sweetness that chords produce with their pleasant encounter, it is 
because they were not yet in the era opened up by the consolidation of the 
potentialities of the tonal system. It is in view of the unfolding of this quarrel that we 
will find, decades later, Jean-Phillipe Rameau trying to demonstrate why “our music 
is more perfect than that of the ancients.”11And note the strong notion of historical 
progress driving this discussion. Our music would not be simply different from the 
old ones, it would be more perfect, it would be more advanced because it would 
finally have been able to unveil the structural principles of dissonance and 
consonance through the fundamental bass, thus allowing the direct thematization of 
the productivity of the constructive principle of form. In this refusal of origin, refusal of 
the weight of meaning guaranteed by the original that would express itself in a time 
without ruptures, aesthetic autonomy will appear for the first time in the West.  
 
Origin of Melody, Melody of the Origin 
The connection between Max Weber and the horizon opened up by Rameau is clear. 
If it is true that a social sphere of values will be more rational insofar as it establishes 
its valuation processes through a systematic plan of organization, a plan that takes 
its own certification from itself, then it is with the consolidation of the harmonic tonal 
system that music would precociously open to other arts the doors of what would be 
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modernity. To do so, Weber will need to assume what Rameau had stated in 1722, in 
a context that was far from being simply reduced to music theory: 
 
Music is generally divided into harmony and melody, but the latter is merely a 
part of the former and a knowledge of harmony is sufficient for a complete 
understanding of all the properties of music12. 
 
This dichotomy, which crosses the musical debates of the 18th century, will oppose 
Rameau to Rousseau, adept at preserving a certain mimetic principle coming from 
melos and its supposedly natural clarity. For Rousseau, following a long tradition in 
which we find Charles Batteaux13 or in Vincenzo Galilei and the Camerata group, 
melos is the preservation of the transparency that prosaic language tends to lose, it 
is speech returning to its singing origin, by the force of rooting expression in the 
immanence with nature. At this point, Rousseau is faithful to the Greek understanding 
of melos as a derivation of the Homeric plurale tantum μελεα which, in turn, indicates 
the members of the body. That is, in this word, the constitution of the body and the 
melodic articulation are thought together, as if it were the case of highlighting the 
unity between the dispositions of feeling, the organicity of order and what is 
accessible to logos14. 
The rupture between logos and melos produced by Rameau, a rupture that 
made his contemporaries see in his music “lack of clarity”, “lack of unity”, “difficult” or 
even a “formless monstrosity” is immediately felt by Rousseau as the last stage of 
loss of transparency of expression, as a dangerous emergence of an autonomy that 
should not be read as autonomy in relation to the forms of social life (as we do 
today), but mainly in relation to the potential of natural normativity. Therefore, this 
autonomy would be just a degeneration that would occur, mainly, through the 
abandonment of a music based on the expressive and mimetic power of the voice, 
in order to embrace a music that is realized, in a degenerate way, as “writing”: “that 
methodical, stiff Music, but without genius, without invention, and without taste, 
which is in Paris called written Music par excellence and which is in fact, at the very 
most, good only for writing and never for performing”15. 
Thanks to Derrida, we know the metaphysical horizon presupposed by the 
topos of writing as a loss of transparency and self-affection proper to the voice16. For 
this topos seeks to sustain an equation between meaning and presence that would 
be definitively broken, at least for Rousseau, as soon as this music proliferates more 
apt for writing than for execution and listening. The critique against “formalism” has 
deep metaphysical roots. It refers to a certain notion of the substance's immediate 
presence to itself broken by the reflexivity of writing. 
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However, just like in Rousseau, there is a "naturalism" in Rameau. We should 
remember how he insisted on naturalizing the harmonic principles that would 
guarantee the consonance of the octave, fifth and third intervals and the dissonance 
of the chord derived from the seventh, performing, with this, the musical version of a 
mathesis universalis. This naturalism is strange to Rousseau for not allowing the 
foundation of a critical horizon linked to the supplementary recovery of the origin. 
This recovery allows for the political critique of language, of this current language 
incapable of making room for the common ground because it presumably no longer 
has any expression. Rameau's naturalism is based on physics, on considerations 
about the immanent normativity of the “sound body”, whereas Rousseau's naturalism 
is a fundamental part of politics. However, this physics will, in turn, make room for a 
politic with strong consequences. 
Let us remember how his Essay on the Origin of Languages ends, a text driven 
by the musical debate with Rameau: “every language with which one cannot make 
oneself understood by the assembled people is a servile language; it is impossible 
for a people to remain free and speak that language”17. A language that the people in 
assembly do not listen to, is one devoid of eloquence, of persuasion for separating 
the people, for being only a speech in its own name, reduced to its instrumental 
condition of description of interests. “The first maxim of modern politics”, Rousseau 
will say about the politics that has concerned us so far, is: “the subjects have to be 
kept scattered” and it is language degraded to its instrumental and communicational 
dimension that separates them. 
Let us remember what Rousseau says: “needs dictated the first gestures and 
passions drew out the first words.” 18 In other words, instrumental speech that 
expresses only systems of needs is a mute speech, closer to pure gestures. It 
separates humans because it places them in a competitive and defensive 
relationship. Nonetheless, 
 
the strength of language does not lie in its power to provide images of things, 
but in its power to set the soul in motion, to place it in a disposition that makes 
visible the order of nature. Language imitates nature when it collaborates with 
order, when it restores, within humanity, the order that its birth had helped to 
erase19. 
 
The matter of language will be present in a certain aesthetic ideology, namely, the 
topic of the restoring power of music that, for Rousseau, is inversely proportional to 
the destitute power of theatre, since the proliferation of representation invites moral 
degradation and perversion of the body politic. Musical autonomy could thus only be 
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a denial of this therapeutic restitution. A denial that will have greater political 
consequences for breaking the implicative force of a common ground mediated not 
by a communication language, but also by an expressive language, that is, a 
language based on the recognition of ties produced by passions. 
Passions are implicative. They never concern just one, they change the other 
when enunciated, they are circuits of affects. For this reason, the language of 
passions is the one that really produces bonds. But passions depend on singing, 
melody, the mimetic power of music: “It is by means of the song, not by means of the 
chords, that sounds have expression, fire, life; it is the song alone that gives them the 
moral effects that produce all of Music’s energy"20, because voice is a promise of 
proximity and contact. This melody of passions makes the true language of the 
people, because being in an assembly is not just the act of being in the same space 
and seeking a consensus between different interests. Being in an assembly is the act 
of speaking another language, foreign to the language of interests, representations 
and strategies, but close to the language of passions. For this reason, true 
assemblies are rare. 
For Rousseau, power not exactly mobilized by passions will always be the 
deepest mistake as it imagines that power mobilizes a language of passions. In fact, 
power will always seek to empty the language for expression, to make it either the 
mere space of unaffected description or the mere space of affirmation of my 
properties, of what separates me from other subjects. For this reason, the first revolt 
will always be a revolt of the language against the possibility of its degradation, a 
search for the language to stop a process described by Rousseau as follows: 
 
that by a natural progression all lettered languages must change character 
and lose force as they gain clarity, that the more one aims at perfecting 
grammar and logic the more one accelerates this progress, and that in order 
to make a language cold and monotonous in no time, one has only to 
establish academies among the people that speaks it21.  
 
The recovery of the expressive force of language is thus the condition for politics, as 
it allows for the emergence of proximity and the end of separation. In this sense, we 
can say that the major form of subjection is the elimination of this expressive force 
and this will be done, among others, when even the music no longer has any force. 
For the natural progress of “literate languages” would consist in losing strength in 
order to gain clarity, which for Rousseau can only mean as a form of subjection. This 
can explain why this new music brought by Rameau can only sound to Rousseau as 
the final consecration of an exact, clear, deaf, literate and, above all, cold language, 
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incapable of playing for passion, what Italian opera and its subjection to singing 
music would be able to do. 
Thus, with Rameau, music would gain autonomy for losing the power to 
produce “moral effects” that are fundamental for the consolidation of a new social 
body in its force of generic implication. To fulfill its own political force, music should, 
on the contrary, submit to a morality, it should not create an ethos from the 
immanent development of its materials. For this reason, the modes of expression 
should be based on a natural and original ground, a strict normative horizon. 
However, let us notice the specificity of the operation that animates 
Rousseau's thought. If we ask ourselves about a musical piece that could well 
express the Rousseauist restorative horizon, we will have no better example than the 
opera that triggered the Querelle des bouffons, namely, La serva padrona, de 
Giovanni Battista Pergolesi. The choice couldn't be more symptomatic. Pergolesi's 
opera not only marks the entry of the comic genre into the operatic field, it is not only 
the expression of a conscious limitation of means in view of the strengthening of the 
text at the expense of the music's autonomy and in favor of the clarity of emotions. 
One must remember how Rousseau chooses an opera whose central issue is 
insubordination, whether of class or genre. 
Pergolesi tells the story of Uberto, who has a maid, Serpina, who doesn't obey 
him, who inverts the relationships of command and who will also end up freeing 
himself from the submission of class and labor relations by becoming his wife. In 
other words, unlike Lully's court operas, Pergolesi brought to the scene a desire for 
popular insubordination in a music with a drastic reduction of ornaments and 
cadences. Rousseau's formal conservatism shows itself as an operator of a politics 
whose true horizon of return takes place at the end of hierarchical subjection 
relations. The simplicity that emerges is the clarity of the popular desire to no longer 
be subjected to a hierarchical labor and masculine power of domination. Moreover if 
encyclopedists, such as D'Alambert and Diderot, will end up taking Rousseau's 
perspective, it is certainly because they perceived the emancipatory and egalitarian 
potential produced by this singular way of appealing to the origin. Which could not 
be different for the theorist of popular sovereignty22. 
This idea of unsubmission is clearly translated musically. And "clearly" is not 
here as a mere rhetorical adjective. Let's take Uberto's first opening sentence, the 
one that unfolds between bars 7 and 20. The text says: “Aspettare and non venire, 
stare a letto and non dormire, ben servire and non gradire son tre cose da morire”. 
The phrase plays with the enunciation of a desire and its refusal. Musically the 
process is clear: the words that express desires (Aspettare, stare a letto, ben servire) 
are sung in an imposing way, like orders, through two quarter notes and a half note 
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at the same height (progressing from G to A and then to B) to reinforce the form of a 
call. But the call finds no one, even raising a tone with each new utterance. There is 
no possible realization and this is musically transcribed by the consequent: always a 
descending sequence one octave below. Like someone screaming in the void, like 
someone screaming louder and getting no answer. This same movement is 
repeated by the strings in a clarification of the musical utterance. The answer does 




A Musical Mathesis Universalis 
Indeed, Rameau's naturalism is of another nature, alien to the restorative force of 
music presupposed by Rousseau, but it will produce a specific form of openness to 
political transformations that is important to discuss. 
Let's start by recalling how Rameau's naturalism is a kind of structural 
naturalism or a very peculiar type of “transcendental naturalism”. It is not based on 
the expression that links us to the natural horizon, but on constructive principles, 
which are based on the immanent properties of the sound material. In an important 
reversal, expression appears subjected to construction. This allows harmony to 
appear as the unfolding of totality through constructive principles that define, based 
on themselves, structures of relationships, subordinations, hierarchy, orientation and 
unity23. In this reading, the fundamental characteristic of modern harmony is its 
capacity to determine the “conditions of possibility” of the musical phenomenon. 
In this regard, let us remember, for example, how the sense of harmony 
among the Greeks did not refer to the consonance of sounds, but to the diachronic 
arrangement in a melodic phrase24. The application of the notion of harmony to 
simultaneous dyads only occurs with the consolidation of polyphonic music from the 
10th century onwards. It is from definitions of this nature that dissonance will appear 
as discord between simultaneous sounds. In musical treatises from the fourteenth 
century onwards, dissonances in note-to-note textures should not be used, although 
they were allowed in passages devoid of rhythmic tension and through notes of 
short duration. It is only with Rameau that dissonance appears as the mobile tension 
of a note in relation to the fundamental sound, that is, it is dissonance in relation to 
the functional structure that defines the organic unity of the work. From then on, the 
distinction between consonance and dissonance will be defined by the conditions of 
possibility determined by the harmonic structure. 
Let us also note how this system preserves unity while defining an orientation 
of development and immanent conflict in the unfolding of form. This is its most 
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singular characteristic: it does not need staticity to guarantee unity, as in modal 
forms, but it produces the coordination of materials through the prior definition of the 
axes that will determine its own temporal transformation. A disenchanted teleology 
rests on strictly formal, internal, and mathematical principles. This is what Weber has 
in mind when he insists that: "There would be no modern music without these 
tensions derived from the irrationality of melody, as they are precisely its most 
important means of expression." 25 For a system that accepts an element that is 
dissonant, “irrational” will be seen as rational, provided that such element can be 
anticipated, prepared and resolved. As Schoenberg will say, a few centuries later, in 
his Treatise on Harmony: “Careful introduction and euphonious resolution: that is the 
system! Preparation and resolution are thus a pair of protective wrappers in which 
the dissonance is carefully packed so that it neither suffers nor inflicts damage”26. 
But there is a point here that should not be forgotten and that radically limits 
the Weberian approach, showing its historical commitment. For such a figure of 
autonomy, in the end, expresses an insidious second-level enchantment, which 
makes it still the continuation of theology by other means. This enchantment is 
inscribed in the normative structures proper to a certain way of conceiving musical 
autonomy and its coherence. This enchantment will remain when it comes to moral 
autonomy. French philosopher and musicologist, Felip Marti-Jufresa says: 
 
Thus, correlatively, to the death of god in music, the musical death of god will 
not only be the disaffection of the cultural sense of art, but the loss of value, the 
unstoppable devaluation of these characteristics, of these attributes marked 
as motors, as force-values of the compose music, as the characteristics 
expected and valued in a composition, as the essential features of the very 
concept of composition27. 
 
Such attributes identified as force-values of musical composition are the coherence 
of form and the unity of its dispersion. For this reason, contrary to the death of God in 
music, this musical death of God will need to wait a few centuries. Even Weber's 
autonomy will still depend on a theology that knows very well how to preserve itself, 
if it doesn't dare to speak its own name. We can say this because one has to ask 
what kind of autonomy is born from this musical form whose axis is Rameau. There 
are two aspects that I would like to emphasize. The tension between these two 
aspects will be a fundamental engine for the unfolding of the musical form. 
First, it’s not difficult to see how we have an order based on principles of 
subordination and hierarchy, with clearly defined centers, even if mobile. We have a 
law that guarantees the integral unity of meaning through respect for a principle of 
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development that, even when broken, allows such breaks only so that order can be 
restored in an increasingly unexpected turn of cunning. Thus, this autonomy as self-
legislation will depend on a “theology of the coherent form” based on a principle that 
is a strict definition of the conditions of progression, a theodicy of victory over 
dissonance by the systematic reiteration of the consonance guaranteed by the 
fundamental bass line. Thus, autonomy guarantees, at the same time, the unity of the 
work, the coherence of form and the directionality of cumulative time with its 
memory, with its regulated process. Autonomy guarantees "unity, coherence, 
development” or perhaps “unity and coherence as a condition for development”. 
Which would be no different for a self-legislation principle, for an idea that will also 
provide the basis for the notion of moral autonomy. For moral autonomy 
presupposes the consistent regularity of behavior and its unity through the extensive 
use of uniform norms. 
It should be noted that there is here a certain cunning of the identity inherent 
in this first emergence of the autonomous form. The emergence of a system that is 
the preparation and resolution of dissonances allows the exercise of a second-
degree identity principle, as a principle that does not call into question the 
production of meaning in the face of the requirements of integration of the 
heterogeneous, of the discordant, of what provokes rejection. It is no coincidence 
that the composer responsible for the first consequent systematization of the tonal 
system has, as one of his greatest works, an opera celebrating the expansionist 
horizons, such as Les indes galantes. Opera that has, in one of its best known 
moments, "savages" singing: 
 
Forêt paisibles, 
Jamais un vain désir ne trouble ici nos coeurs. 
S'ils sont sensibles, 
Fortune, ce n'est pas au prix de tes faveurs. 
 
There is something of the affirmation of the tonal system through the voice of these 
“savages” who sing hearts that are never tormented by desires driven by fortune. As if 
it were a case of remembering that, even where the heterogeneous sings, it is the 
safe restoration of calm forests that is all about. The “savages” will sing in court 
music time, as if we were at a Lully ball. 
 
Dialectic Between Control and Lack of Control 
Let us keep dialectic maneuver in mind when we see, centuries later, Pierre Boulez 
affirming, at a major moment in the reconfiguration of the relationship between form 
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and meaning in musical aesthetics: “the era of Rameau and his 'natural' principles is 
definitively abolished” 28. For one has to go more slowly in adhering to the peremptory 
character of this sentence. Boulez makes this statement and then says: “To those 
who will object to me that, starting from the concrete phenomenon, they obey 
nature, the laws of nature, I will answer, always according to Rougier: 'we give the 
name of laws of nature to formulas which symbolize the routine of experience’” 29. 
However, we could remember that the criticism of the naturalization of the principles 
of consonance and dissonance inherent to the tonal system does not imply criticism 
of the tacit adherence to the idea of a deep relationship between “coherent” form 
and meaning sustained even in Boulez's own serial thought30. The gesture, typical 
toRameau, of appealing to the constructiveness of mathematical thinking, is still 
there in statements such as 
 
When studying the thinking of mathematicians or physicists of our time about 
structures (logical thinking, mathematics, physical theory...), one can clearly 
see the immense path that musicians still have to cross before arriving to the 
cohesion of a general synthesis31. 
 
In other words, in this ode to the structure, we see how we are still facing a certain 
notion of unity, of coherence, of articulation that expresses a concept of 
“composition”, of “creation”, which will not change. It would be interesting to ask 
yourself what is done when a work of art try to decompose the structure32. 
But let us note the major tension of Rameau's gesture, for this tension can lead 
us to a kind of subterranean tendency of the autonomous aesthetic form. This trend, 
when radicalized, removes the aesthetic form from the limits established by moral 
autonomy and its dependence on what we call theology of the coherent form and its 
generating principle linked to the self-legislation of form. Though this trend will 
become radicalized, it will also be gradually boosted and remain our own. 
What is born with Rameau is not just autonomy as self-legislation based on 
self-referential principles. Certainly, the mimetic principle so dear to Rousseau is 
broken so that a functional totality can be built from the strict observance of rules of 
harmonic progression. With that, a constructive coherence is born. But there is 
another side to the idea of the emergence of a system whose major principle is the 
regulation of the heterogeneous. Already in the 18th century, Chabanon realized 
something of this nature when he tried to describe what would be the “new 
language” produced by Rameau's music that gave him the impression of being a 
“foreigner among his countrymen, as if he had been born a thousand centuries from 
here” 33. A characteristic of a new language clearly assumed by Rameau, when he 
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says guided by the “Descartes method” in his search for an Archimedean point 
capable of reconstructing musical rationality beyond the simple repetition of 
traditions and habits. That is why, in this search for clarification about fundamental 
sound, harmonic sound and the differences between sound and noise, Rameau will 
say: 
 
I placed myself as exact as I could in the state of a man who would neither 
have sung nor heard the singing, promising me to resort to foreign 
experiences whenever I had the impression that the habit of a state contrary to 
this one in which I supposed would take me, in spite of myself, beyond 
supposition34. 
 
The state of someone who would never have sung or heard the singing: as if it were 
possible to open an empty space in which new constructive principles would unfold. 
As if the initial aesthetic production were the production of an empty space. 
Such production will allow for structural redefinitions. First, the subjection of 
melos to the musical idea arising from the harmonic construction freed music from 
its subjection to the organicity of what is placed as a natural order, as the musical 
motif will not be the result of a mimetic “painting” of the order. The affirmation of the 
listening initially takes place against its colonization by the mode of disposition of 
vision, as if a thought metaphysically formed by the visuality present in a term like 
θεωρια, found its point of deposition in music. That is why Chabanon will say, 
regarding Rameau's musical motives: “No subject inspires and takes his ideas, it is 
unknown where he takes them, he does something from nothing, it is a creation in 
itself”. This horizon of a certain ex nihilo creation appears to belong to something that 
Chabanon is not afraid to describe as a “revolution”. What could not be different if we 
accept that: “when we listen to purely symphonic music, the spirit is not prevented by 
any idea, and the heart by any feeling, the disorder must arise entirely from the force 
of the sounds” 35. This freedom allowed music to arrange arias in a dynamic of 
expressions and characters hitherto unknown, forcing a process of expression 
release in relation to a grammar typified by emotions. Diderot had understood the 
impact of such a liberation when he writes in Rameau's Nephew, about the uncle in 
question: 
 
He’s the nephew of that famous musician who rescued us from Lully’s 
plainchant, which we’d been droning out for over a hundred years; who wrote 
such reams of incomprehensible visions and apocalyptic verities on the theory 
of music, of which neither he nor anyone else ever understood a word, and 
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who left us with a number of operas where we can enjoy various harmonies, 
unfinished songs, unrelated ideas, uproars, flights triumphal fanfares, spears, 
ennoblements, seditious whisperings, endless victories; he also left us dance 
tunes that will live forever; he buried the Florentine, and will in his turn be 
buried by the Italian virtuosi36. 
 
It is not without irony to see how someone responsible for a system capable of 
guaranteeing a fundamental principle of unity is seen by his contemporaries as also 
someone responsible for music composed with “unrelated ideas” and “unfinished 
songs”. For the liberation of the constructive principle from its mimetic subjection 
through the primacy of the melos would bring, in a short time, a trembling of the 
sensible that Diderot already feels. He feels so much that he makes Rameau’s 
nephew defend a perspective that seeks to base musical rationality on an extra-
musical dimension, linked to the mimesis of passions and prosody. Diderot sees how 
the change operated by Rameau would transform musical rationality, as we will see 
later, into a principle of deformation of form. 
For, within this path, the regulation of the heterogeneity produced by tonal 
harmony will end up revealing a de-regulation of the homogeneous. What could not 
be different, since, as Rousseau had clearly understood, a music no longer based on 
mimesis opens up to an immanent unfolding process. It imposes a continuous 
processuality. 
Thus, there will be a contradiction within the experience of autonomy, which 
could not be different since autonomous art will be facing an ascending capitalist 
social reality where the maximum distance from the world would be, paradoxically, 
the realization of a purified order with which social reification has always dreamed of. 
Adorno already pointed to such a risk when he criticized the hypostasis of serial 
thinking through the topic of “series fetishism”: the last stage of an impasse that risks 
reverse autonomy in its opposite, namely, in servitude. However, in the eagerness to 
block circulation within an order that it radically criticizes, the autonomous work 
needs to compose with what shakes the order, with what decomposes the current 
grammar of our sensibility. And what trembles is contagious, decomposes, takes us 
to an increasingly refractory horizon. For this reason, it does not “purify” the 
sensibility, but shakes it, causing it to continually confront what is a figure of 
dissociation and discord. 
Thus, through the paths of the irreducibility of dissonance, that is, through its 
progressive emancipation in relation to an anticipation-resolution system, through 
the paths of silence that breaks the baroque's fear of emptiness (and we note, for 
example, how silence enters the scene of Castor and Pollux in the prelude “Tristres 
CONTINENTAL THOUGHT & THEORY: A JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM 
 Thinking Music: Praxis and Aesthetics 
 
 
122  http://dx.doi.org/10.26021/12229 
 
apprêts”), or even through ruptures, sudden changes and breaks, the theology of 
coherent form will find its limits. As Hanns Eisler will remind us, it is no coincidence 
that: “The history of music is the history of dissonance” 37. For its story will be the story 
of a reversal of order and the liberation of what disorganizes sensibility. 
This allows us to state that autonomous will be the form capable of 
confronting what destabilizes itself leading itself to abandoning its own constructive 
principle. If tonalism would not be an internally unstable system, it would never 
produce its own negation. That is, and this is perhaps Rameau's most important 
contribution to the emergence of musical autonomy: autonomous is not simply the 
form that asserts itself beyond mimesis. Autonomous is the form that produces a 
trembling of the sensible for being able to operate, in its maximum strength, with 
what the sensibility had been separated from, what is not sung, what there is no 
possible identity, which expresses discord and disharmony. This process will gain 
irreversible strength when it would be associated with what erodes all 
representation, as the sublime and the liberation of expression in relation to the 
phenomenal determination of affections. 
Let us note an important point here. Aesthetic experience can appear as a 
fundamental axis of the social experience of freedom because it accomplishes what 
we could call the affective conditions for emancipation. There are structures of 
affects that block every possible form of emancipation and at the heart of such 
structures is fear, with its procession of separation, immunization, defense and 
paralysis. What the aesthetic form allows is exactly the relationship with what is 
placed in deep heteronomy in relation to our self-preservation regimes. Thus, it 
prepares us for the social experience of a heteronomy without servitude. 
By making what had been defined as “irrational” a moment of its own 
productivity and the affirmation of the coherent sense of form, musical logos put 
sensibility in front of what shakes it. And through those trembling pathways, regimes 
of polymorphic recomposition can emerge. This makes explicit a fundamental 
political dimension of aesthetic autonomy. If we can speak of a “political dimension” 
in this case, it is because such trembling allows for a gradual disidentification with 
the system of organization of material reproduction of the present time, thus opening 
the space to the possibility of other forms of configuration of experience and 
determination. This gradual disidentification will need a long path where it will be the 
case of not only achieving the emancipation from dissonance, but also the liberation 
in relation to order, unity, hierarchy, functionality. Therefore, autonomous is the form 
that walks safely towards its own dissolution. A bit like those organisms that, 
according to Sigmund Freud, try to die on their own terms. 
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Some may see in this theme of a gradual “long journey” the expression of a 
certain philosophy of history guiding, under the sign of the progress, this narrative of 
music towards the liberation of the form in relation to the theological-moral horizon. 
We would thus have a philosophy of musical history that operates by deepening 
contradictions to a revolutionary mutation of the potentialities of form. Yes, there is no 
reason to hide what has no reason for it to be hidden: there is here the 
presupposition of a historical process that organizes itself as a self-fulfillment due to 
an immanent contradiction in itself. Therefore, the musical experience is not simply 
the sound tracing of the aspirations of the rising capitalism and its bourgeois class. 
As it is the expression of a contradiction that social life seeks to deny with all its 
strength, the musical experience may be the fundamental axis for a certain social 
experience of emergence from what denies order. For those who are surprised by an 
alleged over-dimensioning of music, let us remember that there is no ordering 
concept in the field of the common (such as territory, community, state, nation, polis) 
that does not have its limits musically traced; a reminder from Plato who already 
knew very well.  
In fact, this experience of promised social emancipation, described through a 
certain historical process inherent to musical aesthetics in the West, is not the only 
one possible, nor would it need to be considered as such in order to have its interest 
and relevance. It is linked to a certain horizon of experience that constitutes us, 
although it is not the only horizon of experience to constitute us. However, it is worth 
remembering that the recognition of other possible paths does not eliminate the 
interest in accurately describing specific paths. 
There are at least two ways for critical thinking to move: the first is by 
confronting different matrices of thought in order to show the relativity of what we 
have hitherto taken to be universal and irrefutable. Such a strategy can and should 
be used in the reflection on aesthetic experience. But there is still another way for 
critical thinking to work, and it involves the systematic exploration of the self-critical 
turns of a specific matrix. In other words, it is about understanding how a matrix 
denies itself, how it confronts its own limits until it explodes, thus opening space for 
possible resonances with other erased matrices. Or rather, how it denies itself until 
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